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ABSTRACT 
Research found that venture capital financing has a positive effect on firms’ 
growth. Part of this positive impact is explained by the value added, i.e., monitoring and 
strategic advice, provided by venture capital entities (VCEs, hereafter) to their portfolio 
companies. Literature found that spatial proximity between VCE and invested firms 
facilitates the interchange of information, and thus the execution of value added 
activities provided by VCEs. In this work, we investigated whether geographical 
distance, measured in both kilometers and travel time between portfolio companies and 
their lead investor, affects performance. We base our analysis on a sample of 1035 firms 
observed between 1996 and 2018. The results of our difference-in-differences 
econometric estimation indicate that distance matters for companies invested by private 
venture capital entities: on average, firms that are closer to their lead investor present a 
higher growth in terms of assets when compared to the most distant ones. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Literature shows that venture capital entities (VCEs, hereafter) involvement has a 
positive impact on investees’ growth,  in terms of employment and sales growth (Bertoni 
et al., 2011), productivity (Alemany and Martí, 2007), and efficiency (Chemmanur et al., 
2011). This positive effect derives from a screening process, i.e., a meticulous selection 
process before investment (Amit et al., 1998), and both the financial and the non-
financial aid provided by VCEs. The non-financial aid, i.e., value added, consists of 
constant monitoring and strategic advice (Macmillan et al., 1989).  
Chemmanur et al. (2011) and Croce et al. (2013) find evidence of the positive 
effect of non-financial value added on firm performance. In this regard, the more 
frequent the interaction between investors and investees, the greater the value added 
provided by VCEs (Sapienza, 1992). According to Sorenson and Stuart (2001), spatial 
proximity between the VCEs and invested firms facilitates the interchange of 
information and monitoring and value added activities. Hence, the distance between 
VCEs and their portfolio companies may have a negative impact on performance. 
The purpose of this work is to investigate whether geographical distance, 
measured in both kilometers and travel time between portfolio companies and their lead 
VCEs, affects performance, represented by the gross revenues and total assets of 
invested firms over time. 
We focus on a large sample of Spanish venture-backed firms financed between 
2005 and 2012. We compared firm performance in the closest versus the most distant 
firms using a difference-in-differences (DD) methodology with fixed effects. 
The rest of the manuscript is structures as follows. In section 2, we outline the 
theoretical background and develop our hypotheses. In section 3, we describe the data 
and the methodology. In section 4, we show the empirical results. In section 5, we 
include the discussion and highlight our conclusions. 
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
2.1.  Information asymmetries and venture capital 
According to Akerlof (1970), a market with uncertainty and the existence of 
goods of many quality ranges imposes an obstacle to the sound functioning of markets, 
featuring a scenario in which different agents having different amounts of information 
try to take advantage of each other. This situation occurs because the distribution of 
information is imperfect within society, i.e. asymmetrical. This derives in the 
materialization of transaction costs and, ultimately, in agency costs, which consist in any 
effort or inefficiencies incurred when preventing any possible conflict of interests 
between two parties.  
This context of asymmetrical information creates a favorable environment for 
adverse selection within financial markets. The managers of a company naturally have 
more information about it, and their ability to interpret such material is higher than that 
of third parties, since they have an inside perspective of the business. Managers may 
have incentives to not share full information with others, who could become potential 
investors. Also, as sometimes managers may try to transmit a better picture than reality 
as an artifice to mislead the decisions of potential investors, there is a cost in verifying 
the information (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Stein, 2003).  
Small and medium size enterprises (SMEs, hereafter) are highly affected by 
information asymmetries, suffering from adverse selection and moral hazard problems, 
and thus tend to have difficult access to external financial sources. This situation may 
undermine their growth prospects and their future performance (Carpenter and Petersen, 
2002). Therefore, normally the financing of firms at this stage is bounded by their 
internally generated cash flows (Bertoni et al., 2013). 
These financial restrictions to SMEs may have an important impact on the 
economy. SMEs play an important role concerning job creation, economic growth, and 
economic structural change, functioning as the innovation system that leads to structural 
change (Robu, 2013). As Robu (2013) points out, SMEs are considered as the backbone 
of any economy, since, according to OECD, they “represent more than 95% of 
enterprises and ensure 60-70% of the jobs” (Robu 2013, p. 86). Due to their flexibility, 
disruptiveness, innovativeness, and competitiveness, SMEs represent a dynamism agent 
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to the economy, improving productivity and promoting competitiveness within markets. 
As Robu (2013) indicates, regardless of the social and economic standards of a country, 
SMEs stand as the biggest contributors to the gross domestic product and employment 
creation.  
Fortunately, VCEs are specialized in dealing with SMEs' financing problems. 
VCEs are not ordinary investors. Instead, they have very specific skills that qualify them 
to cope with agency costs and asymmetrical information better than other financial 
intermediaries. VCEs reduce information asymmetries by performing a detailed 
screening process, followed by tailor-made contracts and strict monitoring procedures 
(Amit et al., 1998; Weiss, 1991). Moreover, VCEs do not condition their investment to 
the possession of high collaterals, which is convenient for the new entrepreneurial 
businesses that do not have much to offer in this aspect. The main goal of entities that 
operate in the venture capital industry is to build a portfolio of promising innovative 
companies, normally at initial stages of development. In addition to funding, they also 
provide valuable non-financial services to portfolio companies. 
Regarding screening, since venture managers are specialized agents that look for 
promising entrepreneurial companies to invest in, they could be credited for being able 
to pick the winners. Consequently, the better performance of invested firms could be 
explained by this assumption. However, Croce et al.  (2013) studied the impact of 
screening and value added services on the better performance of VC backed high tech 
firms in Europe. In their work, they measure separately the impact of screening and 
value added services on the productivity of VC invested firms, and suggest that the value 
added provided by their mentors has an important impact on performance, beyond that 
of screening.  
The existence of investors specialized in supporting innovative companies has a 
positive effect on the economy. There is a significant positive causal relationship 
between the presence of venture capital investment and employment growth and job 
creation (Belke et al., 2003). Hence, they conclude that governments should facilitate the 
establishment of an institutional environment friendly to the flourishing of a healthy 
venture capital industry so that it can spur a virtuous cycle of entrepreneurial dynamism, 
innovation, and job creation. Croce et al. (2019) also provide evidence that supports 
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such a view. They compare the performance of both private and government-owned 
venture capital entities on job creation during an economic crisis and under normal 
economic conditions. They find that private venture capital backed firms during periods 
of crisis do better (in terms of growth) than those backed by government entities, 
probably due to the broader (political) independence private entities have to perform 
their activity –  like screening, monitoring, and value added services –  in such 
distressing times compared to government-managed entities. During normal economic 
conditions, however, they found that the investments of government-owned venture 
capital entities have a higher impact on employment growth. They claim this is probably 
due to the tendency of government-led investments to prioritize labor-intensive 
industries. Anyhow, as seen, it is suggested that VC activity has an overall positive 
effect on employment growth. 
2.2.The role of financial resources provided by VCEs 
The financial aid provided by VCEs, solely considered, has an important impact 
on the growth prospects of SMEs (Bertoni et al., 2011). This funding plays a crucial role 
in relieving the financial restrictions of SMEs, enabling them to undertake their 
investment projects. Bertoni et al. (2013) found that, after receiving VC funding, the 
investment dependency of SMEs on internally generated cash flows experiences a 
significant reduction. In that the same vein, Bertoni et al. (2010) find that the financial 
constraints of new-technology-based firms backed by independent VCEs disappear after 
funding. Firms that have limited access to external finance present a slightly greater than 
a dollar-for-dollar relationship between growth (of assets) and internal finance, while 
firms that have the possibilities of acceding to significant amounts of external finance 
present a much weaker relationship between growth and internal finance (Carpenter and 
Petersen, 2002). 
Cooper et al. (1994) also share some insights on the benefits of new ventures 
having access to financial resources at early stages of development. They show that the 
amount of initial capital is related to higher probabilities of survival and growth in new 
ventures. According to the authors, a higher amount of funds would provide advantages 
such as the abilities to buy time, undertake ambitious projects, afford high-quality 
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training for managers, which, ultimately, would lead the venture towards better growth 
prospects. 
Finally, according to Shane and Stuart (2002), start-ups that receive venture 
capital funding have more chances of undergoing an IPO and conclude that social capital 
endowments facilitate external funding and have long-term positive effects on the 
performance of new companies. Balboa et al. (2011) also show that the funding provided 
by VCEs has a positive and significant impact on the growth and performance of 
invested firms, mainly in companies at early stages of development. 
2.3. The non-financial value added provided by VCEs 
VCEs take not only a fundamental role in the financing of SMEs, but they also 
provide value added services in the form of experience, management advice, access to 
the network of contacts, coaching, and mentoring (Croce et al., 2013; Sørensen, 2007a). 
Normally, value added comes in the form of periodic visits of investors to invested 
firms, reducing agency costs through monitoring; VCEs managers also help in defining 
strategic planning, management recruitment, and provide investee firms with an 
important network of financial and operational contacts (Sørensen, 2007b).  
Compared to screening, value added services seem to be the main agent to 
impact the performance of portfolio companies (Croce et al., 2013). There is a broad 
variety of studies concerning the role of value added on performance. Macmillan et al. 
(1989) applied a questionnaire in which 350 VCEs ranked the activity of serving as a 
sounding board for the entrepreneurs, i.e. serving as an advice-giving team regarding 
new ideas and projects, as being one of the activities that required the most involvement 
by them as professionals. Hellmann and Puri (2002) find that investors have an impact 
on the internal process of professionalization of the invested firms. VC-backed firms 
make greater use of business and professional contacts when recruiting personnel and 
are more likely to appoint an external CEO (Hellmann and Puri, 2002). 
Croce et al. (2013, p. 503) find that “productivity growth is substantially higher 
in VC-backed firms than in matched non-VC-backed ones after the first VC round”, 
suggesting an important impact of value added services provided by VC managers on 
productivity during the holding period. Additionally, Chemmanur et al. (2011) show that 
the efficiency (total factor productivity) growth is greater for VC-backed companies than 
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for non-VC-backed ones. They argue that is due to the value added services provided by 
VCEs after the initial investment. Sapienza (1992) found that VCE’s involvement in the 
invested firms is positively related to their performance.  
Furthermore, the mentoring and coaching of invested firms by VCEs during the 
holding period may leave a long-lasting effect on the organization and operations of 
invested firms called the “imprinting” effect.  The idea behind this is that the advice 
from VCE lingers further in time because of the upkeep of routines established during 
the holding period. This way, the value added is something that persists over time, even 
after the exit of VC investors. According to Croce et al. (2013, p. 493), “once the impact 
of VCs' involvement (which moves the portfolio firm's productivity towards higher 
levels than before VCs' entry) is absorbed, portfolio firms do not decrease their 
performance (i.e. productivity growth)”. In addition, Davila et al. (2003) mention a 
“reputation effect” that comes along with the funding event; being selected by a VCE 
would transmit a positive signal about the quality of a new venture, reducing the 
uncertainty of being associated with it. This aspect may be important when reaching 
others for additional external financing, i.e., it might be important in relieving the 
financial restrictions SMEs face. This good reputation might play an important role in 
other aspects, like attracting skilled managers and workers and enabling managers to 
undertake projects under a less uncertain environment. 
Some factors may affect the extent to which the VCEs can provide value added 
to the invested firms. It does not depend only on VCEs managers’ willingness to provide 
value, but also on the desire of invested firm’s managers to receive it. According to 
Sapienza et al. (1996), value added is greater in contexts of high uncertainty. The logic 
behind this stands in that the greater the uncertainty, the more willing the managers of 
invested firms will be to improve their decision-making process. Thereby, this implies 
that enterprises at early stages facing high levels of uncertainty are the ones that benefit 
more from value added services. Another factor that may affect VCEs value added is the 
experience of venture managers, whether in venture capital or focal industry. It makes 
sense to imagine that the more experienced they are, the better they will advise. 
Moreover, invested firms would be more open to accepting advice coming from more 
experienced managers who have a better understanding of venture capital or its focal 
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industry dynamics. They found that “operating experience in the venture's focal industry 
added significantly more value than those with less industry-specific experience” 
(Sapienza et al., 1996, p. 440). Concerning experience in the venture capital industry, 
Sapienza et al., (1996) findings suggest mixed evidence to support that. Berglund et al. 
(2007) show that VCE’s general and industry-specific expertise is crucial in the 
experimentation and learning processes of new ventures.  
2.4. Geographical distance and non-financial value added 
An additional factor that may affect VCEs’ value added may be the geographic 
distance between the investor and the invested firm. According to Sorenson and Stuart 
(2001), spatial proximity between the VCEs and invested firms facilitates the exchange 
of information, and thus the execution of the post-investment roles of the first, i.e. 
monitoring and other value-adding activities. Higher distances, which imply higher costs 
both from a financial and human resources perspective, might decrease the value added 
provided by VCEs, bringing negative effects to investees and thus resulting in worse 
performance. The time spent traveling reduces the number of companies that an 
individual can monitor (Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). In addition, Sapienza (1992) finds 
that the greater the frequency of interaction between VCEs and the CEOs of the invested 
ventures, the greater is the value of involvement of VCEs. 
As supported by the empirical evidence illustrated in this section, the value 
added services provided by VCE managers have a major impact on the performance of 
invested firms. This non-financial support contributes to productivity growth, 
innovation, and the success of VCEs’ portfolio companies. Since geographical distance 
may reduce the VCEs’ ability to conduct a proper monitoring process and to provide 
other value-adding services, we argue that distant investee firms should show lower 
performance compared to that of those that are closer to the premises of the VCE. 
Hence, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
H1: Distance and travel time between invested firms and VCEs negatively affect 
the performance of investee firms.   
Furthermore, as commented in the first section, probably due to the broader 
independence when performing their activities, private VCEs seem to have the capacity 
to better monitor their portfolio companies, providing higher value-adding services 
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(Croce et al., 2019). Private VCEs also differ in the contractual organization, facing 
higher restrictions and pressure by their funders (limited partners), which require 
minimal financial returns (Alperovych et al., 2014). Bottazzi et al. (2008) show that 
private VCEs show higher levels of activism when compared to government-owned 
firms, i.e. private VCEs are more involved with their portfolio companies, hence adding 
more value. Conversely, the impact of government-managed VCEs on their investee 
firms is negligible (Grilli and Murtinu, 2014). Therefore, the second hypothesis to be 
tested is as follows: 
H2: Distance and travel time between invested firms and VCEs are negatively 
related to firm performance for companies invested by private VCEs.   
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Sample  
The sample used in this essay consists of 1035 firms that received their initial 
venture capital round in Spain, dispersed across its seventeen regions, between 2005 and 
2012. Data were extracted from three sources: Webcapitalriesgo, for information related 
to investee firms; ORBIS, for the financial and accounting data of these investee firms; 
and Google Maps, for data collection concerning distances and travel time between 
invested company and its respective VCE. Most firms are located in the communities of 
Andalucía, Cataluña, Madrid, and País Vasco. Concerning the current situation of 
analyzed firms, 687 (66%) are active, whilst the rest are inactive due to several reasons, 
like acquisition, dissolution, extinction, or liquidation. 
In this work, the distance between invested companies and their respective 
(leading) VCE is computed in two ways: in kilometers and in time using the most 
effective transportation systems (car, bus, train or airplane) available. Presumably, the 
more time spent in transportation, the higher are the costs of providing qualitative 
support to invested companies, namely, monitoring. The distances and travel time were 
calculated using Google Maps. The process was carried out taking into account possible 
abnormalities that could affect the consistency of data collection. The time of 
displacement to airports was also considered. Care was taken to disregard holidays and 
rush hours in the collection process.  
10 
 
The sample consisted of firms funded by both government-managed and private 
VCEs. In order to test our hypotheses, the sample was grouped into four categories, 
according to the distance and travel time between the investee firms and their respective 
(leading) VCE:  1) companies that are located within the first quartile of distance of the 
sample and the ones that belong to the fourth; 2) companies that are located within the 
first quartile of travel time of the sample and the ones that belong to the fourth; 3) 
companies that are located within the second quartile of distance of the sample and the 
ones that belong to the fourth; 4) companies that are located within the second quartile 
of travel time of the sample and the ones that belong to the fourth. The idea behind this 
choice was to compare the closer and the more distant ones to verify the effects of 
distance and travel time on performance. The distribution between regions and investor 
type is as in Table 1 (first and fourth quartile) and Table 2 (second and fourth quartile). 
In general, companies that were invested by public or government-sponsored VCEs 
prevail among regions, except for Madrid, Cataluña, and Comunidad Valenciana, where 
private VCEs seem to lead the venture capital investment.  
Regarding data collection of distance on Google Maps, the fastest route was 
always considered. The travel time was calculated doing the arithmetic average of the 
higher and the lower travel time estimated by Google Maps. Regarding public 
transportation, priority was given to train and underground. Regarding flight time, when 
available, priority was given to direct connections between airports, and the travel time 
(by car) spent from the airport to the premises of the investee firm was also computed 
and added to estimate the total travel time. 
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Table 1. Sample distribution of investee firms according to region and type of investor 
                       
Firms first and fourth quartile (kilometers) Firms first and fourth quartile (minutes) 
                      
Region 
Public 
investors % 
Private 
investors % 
Total 
sample 
Public 
investors % 
Private 
investors % 
Total 
sample 
                      
Andalucia 90 89.1% 11 10.9% 101 134 94.4% 8 5.6% 142 
Aragon 19 79.2% 5 20.8% 24 16 76.2% 5 23.8% 21 
Asturias 19 95.0% 1 5.0% 20 23 95.8% 1 4.2% 24 
Baleares   0.0% 7 100.0% 7         0 
Canarias   0.0% 2 100.0% 2   0.0% 2 100.0% 2 
Cantabria 2 66.7% 1 33.3% 3 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 4 
Castilla La Mancha 5 62.5% 3 37.5% 8 9 75.0% 3 25.0% 12 
Castilla Leon   0.0% 4 100.0% 4 7 46.7% 8 53.3% 15 
Cataluña 30 19.9% 121 80.1% 151 21 20.0% 84 80.0% 105 
Comunidad Valenciana 4 11.8% 30 88.2% 34 3 14.3% 18 85.7% 21 
Extremadura 13 92.9% 1 7.1% 14 14 93.3% 1 6.7% 15 
Galicia 8 80.0% 2 20.0% 10 7 77.8% 2 22.2% 9 
La Rioja 2 100.0%   0.0% 2 2 100.0%   0.0% 2 
Madrid 18 18.8% 78 81.3% 96 14 16.1% 73 83.9% 87 
Murcia 1 50.0% 1 50.0% 2 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 4 
Navarra 21 72.4% 8 27.6% 29 25 80.6% 6 19.4% 31 
Pais Vasco 18 69.2% 8 30.8% 26 22 84.6% 4 15.4% 26 
Total 250 46.9% 283 53.1% 533 302 58.1% 218 41.9% 520 
  
Sample distribution of investee firms according to region and type of investor for each sample category, first and fourth quartiles. For each category, we have the distribution 
among public and private investors by regions and for the total sample. 
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Table 2. Sample distribution of distances to investee firms according to region and type of investor 
                      
Firms second and fourth quartile (kilometers) Firms second and fourth quartile (minutes) 
                      
Region 
Public 
investors % 
Private 
investors % 
Total 
sample 
Public 
investors % 
Private 
investors % 
Total 
sample 
                      
Andalucia 134 91.8% 12 8.2% 146 167 94.9% 9 5.1% 176 
Aragon 29 82.9% 6 17.1% 35 31 83.8% 6 16.2% 37 
Asturias 45 97.8% 1 2.2% 46 45 97.8% 1 2.2% 46 
Baleares   0.0% 7 100.0% 7         0 
Canarias   0.0% 2 100.0% 2   0.0% 2 100.0% 2 
Cantabria 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 4 2 50.0% 2 50.0% 4 
Castilla La Mancha 5 62.5% 3 37.5% 8 9 75.0% 3 25.0% 12 
Castilla Leon 5 55.6% 4 44.4% 9 11 57.9% 8 42.1% 19 
Cataluña 42 19.6% 172 80.4% 214 38 19.2% 160 80.8% 198 
Comunidad Valenciana 4 9.8% 37 90.2% 41 3 10.7% 25 89.3% 28 
Extremadura 15 93.8% 1 6.3% 16 17 94.4% 1 5.6% 18 
Galicia 10 83.3% 2 16.7% 12 11 84.6% 2 15.4% 13 
La Rioja 2 100.0%   0.0% 2 2 100.0%   0.0% 2 
Madrid 33 25.2% 98 74.8% 131 27 22.1% 95 77.9% 122 
Murcia 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 4 3 75.0% 1 25.0% 4 
Navarra 29 76.3% 9 23.7% 38 29 80.6% 7 19.4% 36 
Pais Vasco 54 87.1% 8 12.9% 62 56 93.3% 4 6.7% 60 
Total 412 53.0% 365 47.0% 777 451 58.0% 326 42.0% 777 
  
Sample distribution of investee firms according to region and type of investor for each sample category, second and fourth quartiles. For each category, we have the distribution 
among public and private investors by regions and for the total sample. 
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3.2. Empirical strategy and methodology  
Our empirical approach is to compare the performance of distant versus close 
investee firms using a DD methodology with fixed effects. In order to do the comparison 
and to observe the average effect of distance and travel time on the dependent variables, 
the sample was divided into four groups: firms that are further away and firms that are 
closer, both in the pre-investment and the post-investment period. The main model is as 
follows: 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼2𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝛼3𝑉𝐶𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑖,𝑡𝑄𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑒𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡  
The dependent variables are the logarithm plus 1 of gross revenues 
(lnGrossRevenues) and total assets (lnAssets) of investee firms, as a representation of 
performance. 
The independent variables are:  
 VCinv, a dummy variable defining the event of the venture capital investment, 
equal to 0 during the pre-investment period and to 1 during the post-investment 
period for each observation. 
 Quartile, an unchanging dummy variable defining the distance or time quartile 
that corresponds to each investee firm, according to the distance and travel time 
taken from its respective VCE. As noted above, in order to test the hypotheses, 
the sample was divided into four groups, hence this variable takes a slightly 
different interpretation for each regression model. In Model 1 and Model 2, this 
variable is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the first quartile of distance or travel 
time, and is equal to 0 if it belongs to the fourth; in Model 3 and Model 4, this 
variable is equal to 1 if the firm belongs to the second quartile of distance or 
travel time and is equal to 0 if it belongs to the fourth.  
The results of a Hausman test indicated that the best estimation procedure would 
be with fixed effects. Since the variable Quartile is unchangeable for each individual 
over time, its coefficient is not estimated in all specifications. 
The coefficient of the interaction term VCinvQuartile is the DD estimator of our 
models, and measures the average effect on the dependent variables of the distance or 
travel time of a firm with respect to its VCE. 
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In addition, the model also includes several control variables (𝜂𝑖). RegionVC is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is located in Madrid or Cataluña (i.e., venture 
capital cluster regions), or zero otherwise. AgeComp it is the age of the company at the 
time of each observation. Private is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the company is 
invested by a private VCE, or zero otherwise. LnKm and LnMin represent the logarithm 
of the distance in kilometers and the travel time in minutes, respectively, from the lead 
VCE’s headquarters to the investee’s premises. Sector and year dummies are also 
considered. 
We build four specifications for each dependent variable to test our hypotheses. 
Model 1, which compares firms located within the first quartile of distance from the 
VCE with the ones that belong to the fourth. Model 2, which compares firms located 
within the first quartile of travel time taken to reach the VCE with the ones that belong 
to the fourth. Model 3, which compares firms located within the second quartile of 
distance from the VCE with the ones that belong to the fourth. Model 4, which compares 
firms located within the second quartile of travel time taken to reach the VCE with the 
ones that belong to the fourth.  
3.3.Descriptive statistics   
In Table 3 and Table 4, we show the average values for our dependent variables 
for the whole sample (including firms that received funding from public VCEs) and only 
for firms that received funding from private VCEs, respectively. The average values are 
calculated, for comparative purposes, for the year before the VC funding (-1) and two 
years after this event (2). In each table, we can see the results for each subcategory, 
according to the quartile they belong to, and the percentage changes between the 
analyzed periods for the investees that are more distant and for those that are closer to 
the lead VCE. In all cases, the average values showed growth after the funding event, 
both for gross revenues and assets. However, it is interesting to observe that, for firms 
funded by private VCEs, growth was significantly higher for those that were closer to 
the VCE’s premises when compared to the distant ones (Table 4), contrary to the overall 
results for the whole sample. This might suggest that private VCEs are capable of 
providing higher value added services (Croce et al., 2019), as discussed in section 2. 
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In addition, the short distance/time of first quartile investee firms justifies the 
consideration of the second quartile as “close” firms. Regarding distance, the first and 
second quartiles go up to 6 and 33 kilometers, respectively, with an arithmetic average 
of 177 kilometers. Regarding time, the first and second quartiles go up to 16 and 37 
minutes, respectively, with an arithmetic average of 71 minutes. 
 
Table 3. Average values for all firms one year before VC investment and two years after 
 
Average values for dependent variables lnGrossRevenues and lnAssets for all firms for the years -1 and 2 since the 
venture capital funding event. The results are clustered by quartiles. There is a column for each case showing the 
percentage growth between years -1 (before VC investment) and 2, two years after investment. 
 
 
Year since VC 
investment
Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth
-1 4.9122 4.8298 7.0323 6.3803
2 11.6176 136.5% 10.9246 126.2% 13.8463 96.9% 13.3104 108.6%
Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth
-1 5.5855 5.2667 7.5564 6.8411
2 11.8744 112.6% 11.1174 111.1% 13.964 84.8% 13.4587 96.7%
Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth
-1 4.9121 5.5039 7.0323 7.1542
2 11.6176 136.5% 11.6791 112.2% 13.8463 96.9% 13.721 91.8%
Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth
-1 5.5855 5.5232 7.5564 7.1738
2 11.8744 112.6% 11.6564 111.0% 13.964 84.8% 13.7079 91.1%
Second and fourth quartile (min)
Second and fourth quartile (km)
Average lnGrossRevenues Average lnAssets
All firms
First and fourth quartile (min)
First and fourth quartile (km)
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Table 4. Average values for private invested firms one year before VC investment and two years after 
 
Average values for dependent variables lnGrossRevenues and lnAssets only for firms invested by private VCEs for the 
years -1 and 2 since the venture capital funding event. The results are clustered by quartiles. There is a column for 
each case showing the percentage growth between years -1 (before VC investment) and 2, two years after investment. 
 
A crucial aspect of the difference-in-differences (DD) methodology is the 
parallel trend assumption (Roberts and Whited, 2013; Wing et al., 2018). According to 
this assumption, the distant and closer firms (to the lead VCE) should show, on average, 
a similar trend before the treatment, i.e., the VC funding. The treated group consists of 
the closer firms receiving VC funding, while the control group consists of the distant 
firms receiving VC funding. In order to verify if this assumption is satisfied, we 
proceeded with a graphical analysis. In Figures 1 and 2, we have a graphical 
representation of the average values for the dependent variables for the 3 years before 
the VC funding through the 3 years after this event, for closer and distant firms and the 
four categories of our sample. Since both the control and treated groups show a similar 
trend before the VC funding, the parallel trends assumption seems to be fulfilled.  
 
Year since 
VC 
investment
Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth
-1 6.5286 4.5749 8.5404 6.5816
2 12.0736 84.9% 10.7354 134.7% 14.3173 67.6% 13.5953 106.6%
Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth First quartile % Growth
-1 6.6007 5.286 8.4586 7.1901
2 12.2805 86.0% 11.0906 109.8% 14.3391 69.5% 13.6921 90.4%
Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth
-1 6.5286 5.3891 8.5404 7.1141
2 12.0736 84.9% 11.5488 114.3% 14.3173 67.6% 13.8514 94.7%
Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth Fourth quartile % Growth Second quartile % Growth
-1 6.6007 5.411 8.4586 7.1291
2 12.2805 86.0% 11.5453 113.4% 14.3391 69.5% 13.8454 94.2%
Second and fourth quartile (min)
Second and fourth quartile (km)
Average lnGrossRevenues Average lnAssets
Private firms
First and fourth quartile (min)
First and fourth quartile (km)
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Figure 1. Evolution of the average values for lnGrossRevenues before and after VC funding 
 
Graphs show a parallel trend of lnGrossRevenues between control (most distant firms) and treated group (closest firms). The dotted line represents the control group. Above each 
chart, we can see which sample it refers to. On the vertical axis, we have the average value for lnGrossRevenues. On the horizontal axis, we have the years since venture capital 
funding; year 0 represents the moment when the venture capital investment occurred. 
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Figure 2. Evolution of the average values for lnAssets before and after VC funding 
 
 Graphs show a parallel trend of lnAssets between control (most distant firms) and treated group (closest firms). The dotted line represents the control group. Above each 
chart we can see which sample it refers to. On the vertical axis, we have the average value for lnAssets. On the horizontal axis, we have the years since venture capital funding; year 
0 represents the moment when the venture capital investment occurred. 
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4. RESULTS 
In Table 5, we show the results of the regression on the dependent variable 
lnGrossRevenues, displayed across two panels: first versus fourth quartile in kilometers 
and in minutes (Panel A), and second versus fourth quartile in kilometers and minutes 
(Panel B). In Table 6 we present the same in Panel C and Panel D, respectively, but for 
the dependent variable lnAssets.  
For all scenarios and dependent variables, the coefficient of VCinv is significant 
(p-value<1%) and positive, confirming that in fact VC funding has an important impact 
on the performance of investee firms. In the next paragraphs, the results of our DD 
estimator are outlined, confirming or rejecting our hypotheses. 
Regarding our first hypothesis (H1), i.e., that distance and travel time between 
invested firms and VCEs negatively affect the performance of investee firms, for all 
firms, the distance in kilometers is not significant for any model specification. As 
regards the distance in minutes, also the results of the interaction variable shown in 
column 3 of panels C and D in Table 6 (Log Assets) do not show any significant 
coefficient. However, the same coefficients in table 5 (Gross revenues) show significant, 
but negative coefficients, indicating that the most distant firms show better performance 
than the ones that are closer to the VCE’s premises. In particular, the coefficient for the 
interaction variable is -0.6170 (p-value<5%, Panel A, column 3), meaning that 
companies belonging to the fourth quartile in minutes grow significantly more in gross 
revenues than those belonging to the first quartile. Panel B (column 3) shows a similar 
negative value (-0.7466, p-value<5%) when gross revenues of second and fourth quartile 
companies are compared. Therefore, for the whole sample (including both public and 
private VCEs), our results do not corroborate H1.  
Nevertheless, since the quality and quantity of value added provided by public 
VCEs is discussed in the literature  (Alperovych et al., 2015; Bottazzi et al., 2008; Croce 
et al., 2019; Grilli and Murtinu, 2014), we considered that the weight of public invested 
firms in the sample might be influencing our results. Hence, in the second and fourth 
columns of each panel, we have the results solely for the firms invested by private 
VCEs. For the dependent variable lnGrossRevenues, we do not have significant results. 
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However, we have significant and positive coefficients for lnAssets (Panels C and D), 
both for distance in kilometers and minutes, providing partial support for our second 
hypothesis (H2), i.e., distance and travel time between invested firms and VCEs are 
negatively related to firm performance for companies invested by private VCEs. For the 
first versus fourth quartile in minutes (Panel C, column four, coefficient 1.1782), we 
have that, for companies that received funds from private VCEs, the assets growth of the 
closest ones is 224,85%1 higher when compared to the most distant ones (p-value<5%). 
When comparing the second quartile with the fourth, both in kilometers and minutes 
(Panel D, columns two and four, coefficients 0.8279 and 0.8523), the closest exceeded 
the most distant ones in around 130% in terms of assets growth (p-value<5%). 
 
                                                 
1 Transformation: (𝑒𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 1) ∗ 100 = (𝑒1.1782 − 1) ∗ 100   
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Table 5. Regressions results on lnGrossRevenues 
 
The table shows the fixed effects results for the dependent variable lnGrossRevenues. The independent variables are: 
(1) VCinv: Dummy variable that takes value 1 from the year of the initial VC investment on, and zero otherwise. (2) 
Quartile: Dummy variable that takes value 1 for firms belonging to the 1-2 quartile of distance, depending on the 
specification, or zero otherwise. The model also includes control variables: Age, Cluster VC regions, plus sector and 
year dummies. In Panel A, we show the results for the sample comparing first versus fourth quartile in kilometers and 
minutes, whereas in Panel B we show the results for the sample comparing second versus fourth quartile firms in 
kilometers and minutes. There are two columns for each comparison: all firms, showing the results for all sample 
firms, and private investors, showing results only for firms invested by private VCEs. The first column shows the 
independent variables of the model; in each respective line we have the coefficients and, in parenthesis, the standard 
errors for each variable. In the last two lines of each panel we can see the number of observations of each regression 
model and the coefficient of determination, R squared. Sector and year dummies are included. Level of significance: * 
p-value<10%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<1%. 
 
 
 
Independent variables All firms Private investors  All firms Private investors
VCinv 3.9562 (0.2902) *** 3.7243 (0.3617) *** 4.2881 (0.3062) *** 3.7208 (0.4363) ***
VCinvQuartile -0.3767 (0.3405) -0.1096 (0.4307) -0.6170 (0.3635) * 0.3079 (0.5299)
RegionVC -2.2585 (0.9984) ** 0.3147 (0.6467) -1.0444 (1.1555) -1.5597 (0.5785) ***
AgeComp -0.0089 (0.0062) -0.0083 (0.0079) -0.0095 (0.0062) -0.01227 (0.0085)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
const 11.2481 (1.1915) *** 14.7968 (2.7554) *** 10.3118 (1.8474) *** 11.0508 (0.7310) ***
Obs. 4563 2498 4308 1818
R² 0.6081 0.639 0.598 0.6308
Independent variables All firms Private investors All firms Private investors
VCinv 3.9908 (0.2781) *** 3.6981 (0.3476) *** 4.3793 (0.2920) *** 3.8746 (0.4082) ***
VCinvQuartile -0.3750 (0.3062) 0.2458 (0.3929) -0.7466 (0.3196) ** 0.0897 (0.4489)
RegionVC -2.2132 (0.9962) ** -0.3023 (0.6614) -0.7708 (1.0625) -0.8645 (0.7818)
AgeComp 0.0132 (0.0118) -0.009 (0.008) 0.0136 (0.0118) -0.0105 (0.0081)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
const 11.7692 (2.1790) *** 14.8363 (2.7793) *** 10.5925 (1.9182) *** 10.8447 (0.7842) ***
Obs. 6764 3156 6655 2741
R² 0.5921 0.6434 0.598 0.6483
Dependent variable lnGrossRevenues
Panel A
First and fourth quartile (km)
Dependent variable lnGrossRevenues
Panel B
Second and fourth quartile (min)Second and fourth quartile (km)
First and fourth quartile (min)
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Table 6.  Regressions results on lnAssets 
 
 
The table shows the fixed effects results for the dependent variable lnAssets. The independent variables are: (1) 
VCinv: Dummy variable that takes value 1 from the year of the initial VC investment on, and zero otherwise. (2) 
Quartile: Dummy variable that takes value 1 for firms belonging to the 1-2 quartile of distance, depending on the 
specification, or zero otherwise. The model also includes control variables: Age, Cluster VC regions, plus sector and 
year dummies. In Panel C, we show the results for the sample comparing first versus fourth quartile in kilometers and 
minutes, whereas in Panel D we show the results for the sample comparing second versus fourth quartile firms in 
kilometers and minutes. There are two columns for each comparison: all firms, showing the results for all sample 
firms, and private investors, showing results only for firms invested by private VCEs. The first column shows the 
independent variables of the model; in each respective line we have the coefficients and, in parenthesis, the standard 
errors for each variable. In the last two lines of each panel we can see the number of observations of each regression 
model and the coefficient of determination, R squared. Sector and year dummies are included. Level of significance: * 
p-value<10%, ** p-value<5%, *** p-value<1%. 
 
Independent variables All firms Private investors  All firms Private investors
VCinv 3.9922 (0.2723) *** 3.6418 (0.3437) *** 4.2050 (0.2957) *** 3.5326 (0.4212) ***
VCinvQuartile 0.3147 (0.3261) 0.5936 (0.4092) 0.3360 (0.3523) 1.1782 (0.5092) **
RegionVC -0.8516 (0.4209) ** -0.1049 (0.6198) -0.7970 (0.5415) -1.4308 (0.5085) ***
AgeComp -0.0108 (0.0082) -0.0026 (0.0056) -0.01219 (0.0086) -0.0041 (0.0066)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
const 12.4382 (0.9469) *** 15.8402 (2.4964) *** 11.1991 (1.0146) *** 12.3044 (0.5332) ***
Obs. 4563 2498 4304 1818
R² 0.5969 0.5945 0.5939 0.5883
Independent variables All firms Private investors All firms Private investors
VCinv 4.0802 (0.2605) *** 3.6367 (0.3320) *** 4.3868 (0.2812) *** 3.5815 (0.3967) ***
VCinvQuartile 0.0770 (0.2894) 0.8279 (0.3733) ** -0.2146 (0.3079) 0.8523 (0.4327) **
RegionVC -0.8105 (0.4177) * -0.0781 (0.6357) -0.4666 (0.5412) -0.5846 (0.8169)
AgeComp 0.0026 (0.0082) -0.0028 (0.0058) 0.0029 (0.0082) -0.0029 (0.0060)
Sector dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
const 11.3371 (1.0845) *** 15.7480 (2.5097) *** 10.8267 (0.9696) *** 11.6890 (0.7342) ***
Obs. 6764 3156 6651 2741
R² 0.5888 0.5983 0.5872 0.5925
Dependent variable lnAssets
Panel D
Second and fourth quartile (km) Second and fourth quartile (min)
First and fourth quartile (km) First and fourth quartile (min)
Dependent variable lnAssets
Panel C
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
VCEs play an important role in enhancing the success prospects and performance 
of SMEs. They offer both financial aid, in the form of capital provision, and qualitative 
aid, in the form of value-adding services. Considering this qualitative aid depends on 
face-to-face interactions, geographical distance between investees and their lead VCE 
might impose costs in providing these services. The purpose of this work is to verify 
whether the distance, measured both in kilometers and in minutes (travel time), had a 
significant impact on the performance of the invested firms. 
Our results support the importance of venture capital funding on the performance 
of SMEs. Regarding our hypotheses, the results do not corroborate our first hypothesis 
(H1), i.e., that distance and travel time between invested firms and VCEs negatively 
affect the performance of investee firms.  
A first explanation for these results might be that, when investing in more distant 
firms, VCEs target mature firms more often than early-stage ones. These ventures 
normally possess more track records, which ease the execution of a quality assessment 
by the VCE. They also require less intensive monitoring, as they are more consolidated 
companies. In addition to that, VCEs that invest in ventures that are more distant use to 
be the more experienced ones, and can provide more qualified value-adding services at a 
lower cost (Sapienza et al., 1996; Sorenson and Stuart, 2001). Another possible 
explanation is syndication, which is a form of overcoming the difficulties created by 
geographic distance on adding value (Fritsch and Schilder, 2012). For all the factors 
exposed above, our models might not have captured the real effect of distance and travel 
time on the provision of value added services by VCEs and on performance under 
normal circumstances.  
However, since the quality and quantity of value added provided by public VCEs 
are debated in the literature, our results are certainly affected by the significant weight of 
firms backed by government-managed VCEs in our sample. When we focus on ventures 
funded by private VCEs, we do not find significant differences in sales between closer 
and distant ventures, but we do find significant differences in total assets growth, thus 
providing partial support to our H2. In particular, when comparing the second quartile 
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with the fourth, both in kilometers and minutes, the closest firms showed a superior 
assets growth around the 130% when compared with the most distant ones (significant at 
the 5% level). 
Further investigation should be carried out in order to clarify the influence of the 
factors mentioned above on our sample and our results. We should start by investigating 
whether the screening process was more meticulous for distant firms. We also should 
verify whether the more distant ventures were in fact more consolidated companies, and 
hence required less value added services efforts. Besides, the VCE’s experience and 
syndication agreements should be studied, in order to establish their conditions of 
providing value added services. 
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